

# TRANSCRIPT

## CLOSED PROCEEDINGS

### ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL RESOURCES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

#### **Inquiry into the CFA training college at Fiskville**

Melbourne — 25 May 2015

#### Members

Ms Bronwyn Halfpenny — Chair

Mr Tim Richardson

Mr Tim McCurdy — Deputy Chair

Ms Vicki Ward

Mr Brad Battin

Mr Daniel Young

Mr Simon Ramsay

#### Staff

Executive officer: Dr Greg Gardiner

Research officer: Dr Kelly Butler

#### Witness

Mr Colin Cobb.

**Necessary corrections to be notified to  
executive officer of committee**

**The CHAIR** — On behalf of the committee I welcome Mr Colin Cobb to this private hearing. The Parliamentary Committees Act 2003 provides for the committee to take evidence in private. The transcript of this hearing will be made public in due course — probably in a few weeks. All evidence taken at this hearing is protected by parliamentary privilege as provided by the Constitution Act 1975 and the provisions of the Parliamentary Committees Act 2003 and is protected from judicial review. Any comments made outside the precinct of the hearing are not protected by parliamentary privilege.

All evidence given today is being recorded, and you will be provided with a proof version of the transcript. Following your presentation to us this morning committee members will ask questions relating to the evidence that you have provided to us. Thank you for coming in.

**Mr COBB** — Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to be here. I am aware of the time constraints, so I hope I can cover all of this.

I was employed by CFA for 32 years, and I had 8 years as a volunteer. My service started with CFA as a volunteer and a junior in 1962. I was appointed to the permanent staff as a firefighter at Bendigo in 1968. The rank structure in those days was that a firefighter worked his way up to senior firefighter after four and a half years, and then he could sit for officer ranks. I was promoted to station officer 1, and in those days the station officer ranking went from 1 through to 5, which was senior station officer. From then on the ranking structure went from regional officer 1 up to regional officer 5.

I was promoted to station officer 1 in Morwell in 1973 and then to station officer 3 in Boronia in 1976. In 1980 I was appointed the officer in charge at Springvale fire station, station officer 4. In 1984 I was then transferred as the senior instructor to Fiskville. I was at Fiskville from 1984 to 1987 as an instructor, three and a half years. While at Fiskville I was promoted to regional officer 5. There were no higher promotional assessments in the organisation at that time, so I then qualified for assistant chief but remained as a regional officer 5. I transferred out of Fiskville to Dandenong in 1987 to become the officer in charge of the Dandenong region.

I resigned from the CFA in 1994 and later became a volunteer at Yarrowonga in 2001. I was re-employed as an instructor at Shepparton from 2003 to 2008, and I retired in 2008. I was re-employed after Black Saturday by the CFA for the recovery and the Black Saturday coronial inquiry for a few months. I resigned finally as a volunteer in 2009 after a total of 40 years service, disillusioned and disappointed at the organisation.

Our time at Fiskville — my wife and I — from 84 through to 87 was in part enjoyable. The CFA was like a big family in those days. Work was exciting, Fiskville was a great place. The ‘college of knowledge’ we referred to it as. Officers wanted to go there. But like life, there were good days and bad days. From 1987 when I left Fiskville as an instructor until I resigned in 1994 I attended Fiskville on numerous occasions as an examiner for staff promotions and assessments as well as for meetings and conferences.

Getting to the terms of reference, term of reference 1, the history of ‘pollution, contamination and unsafe activities’, I will start with the water supply at Fiskville, what I believe may have been part of the health issue problems. During my time at Fiskville the water supply to Fiskville came from Ballan. This I understand was in a metal 100-millimetre pipe. This provided the domestic water to the property. Other than this there were some water tanks on the older buildings. Domestic water to the residences was at most times extremely poor quality. On numerous occasions the water was so discoloured that you could not see through a glass of water. As for washing your clothes or towels or sheets, they would come out badly discoloured, and the kids would be afraid to get in the bath. Our white uniform shirts would turn beige and were later sent to Ballarat daily for laundering. The damage to our sheets and towels did not make the wives happy. When I complained to the officer in charge at the time and to the chief officer about this issue, I was told, ‘Well, you decided to live here’.

Nothing was done about the situation until a visiting board member became extremely ill from drinking some of the water. Then a treatment plant was constructed. This could not handle the volume of water. This was about 1987. Filters were offered to each household so you could try to filter out some of the gunk that was in the water. These would block up after one or two days, and you would have to continually replace them. Small domestic water tanks were fitted to each residence to provide drinking water. In theory this was good. However, all the gunk from the fires on the PAD 500 metres away was going into the atmosphere and settling on the roofs and then being washed into the tanks. Even on the PAD area a water tank was on the old fire station. This at times was used to fill the urn for smoko. I questioned the water supply contamination: was it contaminated before it arrived at Fiskville or did it become more contaminated after it arrived?

Before I talk about the PAD fires, I would like to explain why we put firefighters into hot black stuff, the five-man fog attack, which you have heard about. I may need to use the whiteboard. You have seen the photographs from AIP, and their photographs will explain the position of these men and what they were doing. As you go through those photographs you will see the five-man fog attack in the background there with a protection line and on some occasions they have foam underneath their feet to give them flashback protection.

We were putting officers and firefighters into these situations of these huge, black and extremely hot fires. The idea of doing that was a wall of protection. In those days breathing apparatus was not a common thing. In the 1980s there was no breathing apparatus. A lot of brigades did not have it and these outside courses, their students had never been trained in it. You had to maintain so many cylinders per year to maintain your ticket to use breathing apparatus. That became a problem because a lot of the brigades did not have it, so they were never trained in it.

To use the five-man fog attack, we would set the fires extremely hot with the various chemicals and then we would get the two lines of 38-ml hose with five men inside the protection line. Each of those hose lines would produce a large wall of water in very fine droplets. This would give them protection from the heat as they advanced into this. This is a firefighting tactic that is still used. It protects them so that they can get into the cabin of a truck or to a valve or whatever may be involved in fire to either carry out a rescue or to shut off those valves.

In the chemical industry and the refinery industry it was a way that they could get to valves that had been fractured and give the firefighters some protection. They could actually walk up to within a metre or that of an extremely hot fire and with their limited protective clothing feel safe enough to put their hand out and shut off those valves. So those tactics were extremely important in the way they were being taught. Perhaps I will not go to the whiteboard because I think I have explained it. If you are unsure of it, I could probably go on.

The tactic of firefighting was called the five-man fog attack. It was designed to allow firefighters to advance on extremely hot fires with the protection of a high-pressure water curtain as protection from the heat. An example, as I said, was to gain access to a burning vehicle, gas tank or valve or large flammable fire. These exercises were conducted to give the students, whether they were volunteers, permanent firefighters or from outside courses, confidence in gaining access to a hot situation. No BA was worn, only turnout coat, helmet and overtrousers. As I stated, BA was a separate course and required other conditions to continue using it.

I now go to the PAD fires. Ken Lee has previously spoken about some of the stuff there. As was previously said, these fires were large, black and toxic, as you can see from those photos that have previously been produced. The flammable liquids were sump oil and heavy diesel, as Ken has already said, laced with other highly flammable substances. Many unknown substances were given to Fiskville by the chemical companies as a way of disposal and brought to Fiskville in unmarked 200-litre drums. At the time there was the oil crisis with the first Iraq war and petrol was extremely expensive. AIP — the Australian Institute of Petroleum — and others were customers who brought outside students to Fiskville. I was the coordinator of some of those courses.

Instructors would do four to five drills per hour for 6 to 8 hours a day, working nights and weekends when the volunteers were available. The volunteer students would at the end of the sessions emerge with black, sooty faces; red eyes; noses and lungs full of gunk; and wet through from the hose sprays. Coats, trousers and helmets were used by others and became very dirty and were only roughly cleaned, if at all, before passing them on to the next course.

Some of the other known products burnt on the PAD were tyres, cars, LPG, Avgas. Treated timber, which is arsenic treated, was used in the fire building. There were previous reports on Fiskville. I refer to the Joy report of June 2012. The report made comment of the acute and chronic toxicity of benzene, toluene and xylene that may have been present in the drums and solvents in the drums. In the case of benzene, the report noted that it was a recognised carcinogen of blood-forming tissue. The Monash report of 2014 also identified significant increased risks of melanoma, brain cancer and testicular cancer in the PAD operators and the instructors. I have had melanoma and numerous skin cancers.

Some of the extinguishing agents used included various types of foams: ATC, which is alcohol-type concentrate foam; AFFF, which is aqueous film-forming foam; protein foam, which was the old hoof and horn meal-type foam; and hi-ex foam, high-expansion foam. Other agents were BCF, which is bromochlorodifluoromethane;

BCM, bromochloromethane; CTC, carbon tetrachloride, which was outlawed in the early 80s; and dry chemicals of varying sorts. Some foams were donated to Fiskville by the airport fire service, as it had past its use-by date. Fiskville was known as a dumping ground for many things within the fire service and in industry.

I would like to highlight a significant incident that occurred at Fiskville in November 1982, when two officers, Alan Bennett and Don Pink were looking for some fuel to burn. I have spoken to Alan twice in the last week about this particular incident. There was no compound in those days. They went to some drums, tipped some liquid out and tried to light it. It would not ignite. They walked away thinking it was inert. Then the explosion occurred, sending the drum 20 metres into the air, causing a fire and vapour cloud. Alan was crook after that, with dizziness, hearing loss and nose problems. He was sent on sick leave and later supered out. Later the CFA deputy chief officer, Brian Potter, and assistant chief officer, Bill McIntosh, decided to dispose of the drums. No disposal company would take them so a decision was made to bury them. The burial of the drums is really another story.

Alan Bennett tried for over five years to obtain information from CFA as to what was in those drums. After some legal action, in about 1990 he obtained a 32-page report on the type of chemicals involved and was required to sign a confidentiality agreement not to disclose it and was paid \$4000 for his silence. After that, Alan wrote to CFA on a number of occasions to try and get them to release the information to assist those suffering. The duty officer of the day wrote a report on the incident and was told by the officer in charge of Fiskville, 'I don't think we should send this in, or we may have to rejig it'. As I have previously stated regarding the water and other issues, if you complained, you were told 'It's not your problem' and you were always fobbed off.

Remembering that we were a paramilitary-type organisation, there was a rank structure and we did as we were told. Occ. health and safety was not a high priority. Storage and handling placards did not exist in the time I was at Fiskville; only later did that start to come into effect — around 1987 — when hazmat training started. That is when the placarding started to appear and they started to put up signs. We had procedures starting to be taught on how to handle and how to identify different chemicals. That is when the placarding started to appear on transport and similar structures.

No compound existed for the 200-litre drums in the early days, but then the gates were rarely shut anyway. Other incidents occurred. Steve the gardener discovered drums in a shed that had self-combusted. Steve died of cancer. With the burial of the fractured and leaking drums, the contractor who helped to bury some of those, Henry Hume, was exposed. He died of cancer.

Term of reference 2 is the health impacts on employees, residents and students. You have already heard about chief officer Brian Potter and others' stories. I would like to mention some of the mates I worked with who cannot speak for themselves. The first officer in charge of Fiskville was assistant chief officer Chester Nevett. He died of lung complications. His 2IC, Jack Scott, died of leukaemia, cancer of the face and emphysema. His wife, who also lived on the property, died of pancreatic cancer. Senior instructor Bob Dixon died of kidney cancer. Senior instructor Gavin Maguire died of brain tumours. Instructor Bob Penna died of oesophageal cancer.

**The CHAIR** — Take your time.

**Mr COBB** — Instructor Colin Pinkerton died of multiple myeloma and heart disease. PAD operator and nearby resident Maurice Conlan died of cancer. Henry Hume, a contractor, also died of cancer, and Steve the gardener died of cancer. Those suffering serious health problems — Alan Bennett, who I have spoken about, and others like Rod Walters and myself — have melanomas.

Term of reference 3 is the role of past and present executive management at Fiskville. This is not only about the failings of management at Fiskville; we know there was a total disregard for occ. health and safety in the storage and handling of substances, in the lack of BA use, in the lack of information, in the lack of caring. But also the CFA board, the chairman and chief of the 1980s and 90s knew of the 32-page report on the chemicals in 1992, and they kept it hidden. My questions are: who authorised the report? Who authorised the payment to Alan Bennett? Who authorised the confidentiality agreement? Who kept it quiet? Why was it not released? Others should know about the chemicals involved. This all leads to the head shed — CFA headquarters. I believe the CFA chairman, board and chief officer had a duty of care for the safety of staff, residents, volunteers and

students, and they failed. They have been deceitful and negligent, and they should now take responsibility for what happened at Fiskville.

Term of reference 4 is the feasibility of decontamination and rectification of Fiskville. Fiskville is probably a \$150 million training facility that is greatly needed in Victoria. It built camaraderie and teamwork for both volunteers and permanent staff. To replace this infrastructure would cost much more. The regional training grounds at Bendigo, Wangaratta, Bangholme and the like cannot do the same job — they cannot do the big burns. In the early days Fiskville had permits from the EPA to allow these big burns. They were the only place in the state, I believe, that could do this. Fiskville has live-in accommodation; that is where you build the teamwork. If it costs \$15 million to decontaminate Fiskville, fix the water supply and purchase adjoining farms, then it would be a far better option than starting a new site.

Term of reference 5 is recommendations to mitigate harm and provide justice to victims. The CFA needs to release the report of the details of the chemicals involved so the doctors treating the sick know what they are dealing with. As for compensation to families of the deceased or the sick, I do not know how you do that. Thank you.

**The CHAIR** — Thank you so much. Is it okay for us to call you Colin?

**Mr COBB** — Yes.

**The CHAIR** — I was just wondering, not knowing a lot about the CFA, about the connection between Fiskville, the operation there, and head office and all the various fire stations. How was responsibility or training or information provided to each area? Did they operate alone or was there an overarching system? How did it work?

**Mr COBB** — The rank was the chief officer, and in those days there were two deputy chiefs. One was in charge of operations, meaning fire stations, fires, all that sort of thing; the second deputy chief was in charge of training, meaning the Fiskville department, the fire protection department and the manufacturing of vehicles et cetera. So the rank structure was the chief, deputy chief, assistant chief officer at Fiskville, who was in charge, and then down to the senior instructor there, who was a regional officer 5, and then down the ranks.

**The CHAIR** — How did they communicate? I suppose I am getting at what chemicals were there, what was going on in terms of reports. I am just trying to understand the connection between the senior officers and decision-makers and the people working at Fiskville. Did they work in a vacuum, or was there a lot of contact to and fro?

**Mr COBB** — No. As far as I understand it — remembering that Mr Potter was officer in charge at Fiskville and then he was promoted to deputy chief — the assistant chiefs at the time who were in charge of Fiskville were responsible for their own fuel supplies to run the training ground. Anyone offering free fuel would have their offer taken up by the management at Fiskville. Head shed would not need to know about that. They would just be pleased to see that they did not have to fork out for petrol or whatever to run the place. As Ken said earlier, if it was an outside course like AIP — the institute of petroleum — providing their own fuels to burn, then it reduced the cost of that course to them.

**The CHAIR** — Although I think Brian Potter's statement also talked about those organisations paying to have the training done there, and that money would not stay at Fiskville, would it?

**Mr COBB** — No.

**The CHAIR** — Who would have the contract or arrangement?

**Mr COBB** — They would be billed for it. At the start of the year a budget would be set for Fiskville. When they did outside courses, they would be billed for the courses and the money would probably go back into headquarters' big pool and then at the end of the year it would be budgeted again that next year we were going to need X for structure or for fuel or whatever to run the courses.

**The CHAIR** — Thanks.

**Mr McCURDY** — Colin, what was your relationship with Brian Potter? It appeared when you were talking earlier — were you not comfortable with the changes? Did he support you in those changes or not?

**Mr COBB** — When I went to Fiskville I think Brian was deputy chief, and then he became chief officer while I was there. During his time at Fiskville he was the officer in charge. I was not at Fiskville at the time, but his position, to me — from my understanding — would not put him on the PAD very often. He was assistant chief; instructors were the ones out on the PAD. He lived there on the property, like many others. He was the one I spoke to about the water, and I was told, ‘Well, you decided to live here’.

**Mr McCURDY** — Your colleagues who have passed on — that happened after you left in 87. Could you see the writing on the wall when you were there or when you left that changes needed to be made?

**Mr COBB** — No. I could not see the writing on the wall when I left the organisation in 1994. All this was unknown to us. Nothing was highlighted. The report of 1992 through Alan Bennett was all kept secret. Nothing came out until recently, just prior to the Joy report, about 2011.

**Mr RAMSAY** — Does that report have a name?

**Mr COBB** — Which report is that?

**Mr RAMSAY** — The report in 1992. How do we track it?

**Mr COBB** — The Country Fire Authority must have a copy of this report. Alan Bennett was given a copy of this report. I know he still has it. He is not well enough to be here. He got very disheartened with the organisation and almost burnt the report.

**Mr RICHARDSON** — Thanks for coming in, Colin, and for your detailed account. One thing I picked up on in your presentation was about the EPA issuing permits. Could you take us through that process and then whether there was any oversight from the EPA of what was burnt and what was going on during that period?

**Mr COBB** — I think when Fiskville first started they must have — I am only guessing, but we had EPA approval to burn those, remembering that CFA was a semi-government organisation. EPA was a government organisation. You did not encroach on another government department. I doubt they ever visited Fiskville.

**Mr RAMSAY** — My initial question was about the report, but I suspect we will do some more work on that to try to get access to that report in 1992. Do you have concerns about the relationship between EPA and CFA even now, given the CEOs seem to be rotating, or were rotating?

**Mr COBB** — I do not know whether I am qualified, but what I see is that they were still two government departments, and one leaves the other alone.

**Mr RAMSAY** — In relation to the contamination of water, contamination of soil and contamination of air, and that all comes under the auspices of the EPA, the fact that there were, or seemed to be, two statutory bodies that seemed to be guarding themselves, the reason why the EPA seemed to be somewhat limp in making sure that the CFA were adhering to the legislative requirements of the EPA — we seem to be seeing time and again, going back to Tim’s question, that the EPA was not being particularly active in making sure that the air quality, water quality and soil quality were safeguarding the people in the vicinity, as they are now. Now you see, if there is any pollution anywhere, the EPA is almost jumping on top of it.

**Mr COBB** — I would agree with what you are saying. It seems that they are being lenient towards them. It is a bit like the Joy report, which seemed to be a very soft report on Fiskville. It touched the surface; that was all.

**Ms WARD** — As we discussed with Mr Lee, in his testimony he spoke about changes to occ. health and safety regulations and that that was an evolution — it rolled along — and it seemed, though, that it really started to make some changes towards the end of the 1980s. Is that your recollection?

**Mr COBB** — Yes. There was virtually no occ. health and safety involved. It was, I think, about 1987 when the first hazmat training started. That is when we started to get the placarding and things like that.

**Ms WARD** — So that is when you started to get training on how to handle chemicals as well?

**Mr COBB** — Yes. That is when we were given information that we could identify. That is when industry started identification at their gates with haz-chem signs on there. They would have symbols that would tell firefighters and emergency responders actually the types of chemicals. It would have a symbol like '2WE' or something like that. Then you would go to your — you should know that '2' told you the type of extinguishing agent used. The 'W' told you what sort of protective clothing you needed to go in there to fight that fire, whether it was just breathing apparatus or whether you needed full-body gas suits or whatever. The 'E' was for emergency evacuation. All that started to come in about 1987. Before that, firefighters were like the canary in the cage. They would go in, and when the first one fell over you knew there was something wrong.

**Ms WARD** — In this period of 1987, was that when unlabelled barrels stopped appearing on the site?

**Mr COBB** — I do not know whether — I think they are probably still there.

**Ms WARD** — They were not being delivered anymore, though?

**Mr COBB** — I do not know about the delivery. Ken is probably the one who could give you better information about that because he handled the fuels. He went and got the fuels. When it was unloaded, they unloaded the fuels off the trucks. As an instructor that was not my role, so I do not know about that.

**Ms WARD** — Do you think the way that Fiskville was managed at the time in terms of handling chemicals — let us say during the 1980s — was compliant and reflected the changes that were also happening in the broader community regarding OHS?

**Mr COBB** — I do not think there was any compliance at all. There were no OHS procedures for the handling of it. There was no placarding. There was no identification on the drums. As Ken said, he carried flammable liquids in open containers. The dangers of that were extreme. He was carrying it up to places where there were already naked flames. It just did not exist.

**Ms WARD** — Do you think the CFA should have known better at that time?

**Mr COBB** — They should have known better.

**The CHAIR** — Regarding what you were saying about the CFA as an organisation before, it seems from the information we have seen — people had rashes and gastro and illnesses — that there were not a lot of people saying much to management about these problems. No-one seemed to be asking questions or whatever. Professor Joy blamed it on the can-do attitude of people, being a bit gung-ho and macho and all of that. Do you think it was that, or was it a sort of loyalty to the CFA and a belief the organisation would be looking after people so they did not need to worry about all those things?

**Mr COBB** — A bit of both. We were a big family. It was just an organisation where we were all there and enjoying what we were doing. We were not aware of the chemicals that were there. We just thought our employer would be looking after us and the volunteers as well.

**Mr McCURDY** — How do you see that justice can be achieved for those who have been affected at Fiskville?

**Mr COBB** — I really do not know. I have no idea, Tim. An apology would be good for a start. After that I do not know how you sort it out. Money does not fix things.

**Mr RICHARDSON** — I have a quick one, Colin, on your contact with the CFA to date and your engagement. Did you engage with the Joy report?

**Mr COBB** — Yes. I had an interview with a retired investigator, who came and spent a number of hours with us at home. My wife and I were both asked a number of questions, and we made statements.

**Mr RICHARDSON** — Do you have a copy of that transcript?

**Mr COBB** — I do not have that with me.

**Mr RICHARDSON** — Would you be happy to provide that to the committee?

**Mr COBB** — Yes. It is very similar to what I have said today.

**Mr RICHARDSON** — Fantastic. Following on from that, what are your personal thoughts on why there was a time cut-off? I know you served through the mid-1980s but were still in the CFA family. Why the Joy report only went for that 28-year period up until 1999, what are your thoughts on it, getting to the present day, which is what is informing our inquiry? What are your thoughts on that arbitrary cut-off?

**Mr COBB** — I left the CFA in 94, and I have got no understanding of why they would cut it off at 1999. In my mind the worst period at Fiskville was in those 80s and 90s when they were using these dumps. In later years the fuels had all been cleaned up, the water supply was still the problem.

**Mr RAMSAY** — In relation to the report, I want to make sure that we are talking about the same report. In the Joy report it refers to a consultant report in 1988 that was given to the CFA, and you are talking about a report in 1992. Can we assume they are both one and the same?

**Mr COBB** — The Joy report was done later than 92.

**Mr RAMSAY** — Not the Joy report, but the 1988 report — consultant's report — that the CFA requested in relation to —

**Mr COBB** — The report regarding Alan Bennett and the chemicals, is that the one you are talking about?

**Mr RAMSAY** — I am trying to get some clarity around the reports.

**Ms WARD** — There is a number of reports.

**Mr RAMSAY** — The report I was interested in was the report that you referred to. We call it the Bennett report, for want of a name, in 1992 which identified the chemicals that were being used in the pit.

**Mr COBB** — Yes.

**Mr RAMSAY** — As I understand, there is another report that was referred to in the Joy report in relation to the consultant's report in 1988. I do not know whether that provides similar information.

**Mr COBB** — It may be the same report. I do not know whether the 88 report is what Alan finally got, because I have not seen that and I am not privy to that.

**Mr RAMSAY** — It would be handy for us to know, because that is probably on the public record, that consultant's report, as it is mentioned by the Joy report.

**Mr COBB** — Yes.

**Mr RAMSAY** — But the report you are referring to we might well have to tease out from somewhere else.

**The CHAIR** — We can get it from Alan Bennett maybe.

**Ms WARD** — Have you got any knowledge then that there were records kept of the chemicals that were being managed that would have led to this Bennett report, or do you think that it has come out of analysis that has come out of this space?

**Mr COBB** — I think it has come out of analysis by chemists or someone who has done samples or taken samples from Fiskville. There was no records kept that I understand of these things that were taken to Fiskville, unless it was by the chemical companies who supplied it.

**The CHAIR** — The people that you talked about that are very ill or have passed away, is there health monitoring that the CFA is doing, or is it just somebody having to go up and say, 'Hey, I want to be on this register'. Are they actually actively out there trying to trace people?

**Mr COBB** — I think what happened is that anyone who contacted Fiskville — I think like a committee investigating Fiskville in the early Joy report — contacted that, and then CFA contacted each of those and said, ‘Would you like to go on a health monitoring system?’, and a lot of people put their hand up. Annually they send you for blood tests. Those blood tests are then given to either the CFA doctor or your own doctor, and you can go and discuss that. Annually they continue that now for five years. If those tests actually indicate something is wrong, the CFA do not want to know about it. They are only doing the tests. You can talk to the CFA doctor, but if something is high there or needs further follow up, they do not want to know.

**The CHAIR** — So they just tell you, ‘You had better go and get this checked’?

**Mr COBB** — Yes. That is right.

**The CHAIR** — Or go somewhere else and — —

**Mr COBB** — That is right.

**The CHAIR** — Okay. And those people that have passed away. Have they been putting together information about those people, do you know?

**Mr COBB** — No, not that I know of. No. They would all be prior to, most of those.

**The CHAIR** — Yes.

**Mr RICHARDSON** — On contact with CFA and the thought of compensation, Colin, whether you have had any contact with the CFA and if you have considered that at all.

**Mr COBB** — No.

**The CHAIR** — Thanks very much for coming in and talking to us.

**Witness withdrew.**