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LAW REFORM COMMITTEE

Inquiry into powers of entry, search, seizure and questioning by authorised officers

Melbourne – 12 December 2001

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Necessary corrections to be notified to executive officer of committee

The CHAIRMAN — On behalf of the parliamentary Law Reform Committee I welcome Felicity Hampel to the public hearings on the inquiry into the powers of entry, search, seizure and questioning. I invite you to speak in general terms to the reference and then we will ask questions.

Ms HAMPEL — Thank you for giving me, on behalf of the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties, the opportunity to speak to you. It is important that organisations like Liberty Victoria are valued by government and parliamentary committees and invited to speak on such matters.

I add to that an apology for not providing a written submission. The fact that we are a volunteer organisation, our greatest asset being the brain power of our members, means that often because we are a committee of volunteers it is hard to provide to you a written submission of the quality that we would like, as statutory agencies or other funded organisations do. That is not a whinge; it is simply an explanation that it is not a lack of courtesy to the committee or a lack of preparation but a resource issue.

The third and final preface statement is that the committee is probably unaware that I spoke on behalf of Liberty Victoria to the Senate scrutiny of bills committee on the powers of search and entry. That was, I thought, a rewarding experience. They asked me to return on a second occasion and discuss the matters again.

In reviewing this committee's discussion paper, I was heartened to see not only the amount of attention the committee had given to the Senate inquiry but also the amount of reference from the Senate after putting the issues of principle that had been raised by Liberty Victoria in the submissions before the committee.

That preface leads straight into what I would say about the general matters, that by and large we support the principles outlined in the Senate committee report. Our primary position is that powers of search, entry, seizure and questioning should be consistent across the whole range of authorities and agencies having the power to exercise those powers. The consistency should be by reference to a standard enshrined in an act of Parliament so that the principles governing the grant of powers to search, entry, seizure and questioning are available and are known to everybody.

In our view, that makes it not only much better for successive parliaments to see the principles that have been adhered to by the previous parliaments, but it is something that is of enormous importance to the agencies that are given the responsibility of exercising those powers, and also to citizens — those whose rights are likely to be affected by a proper exercise of power. That means I come back to accepting that there must be a right of government agencies to enter premises to carry out searches, to seize documents and exhibits, and to question people, but because those are all intrusive acts they must be balanced against the general freedom to act and do as one wishes provided one is not breaking the law or giving rise to reasonable apprehension that one is breaking the law, or for the last category, provided one is by reason of either participation in the community or existence as a taxpayer or by reason of having a right of privilege, such as some type of licence which carries with it obligations to keep records, to pay tax and the like, but thereto there may be a right required to ensure that those obligations are complied with.

Those three categories essentially still fall underneath the minimum intrusion necessary to ensure that the law is kept, that investigations can properly be carried out and that regulation, where self-regulation or licence-holders are operating, that the enforcing of regulation or enforcing of law following the regulation is done in a way that balances the right of the individual not to be interfered with any more than is necessary for those ends.

Having those principles enshrined in an act of Parliament is essential to achieving those ends so everybody knows what they can and cannot do. There is a greater confidence in the organs of state so that there is not a resentment or fear about arbitrary or capricious use of power or unreasonable expectations in the citizenry as to what they can or cannot do. These ends are served by having the powers contained in the statute, and that statement of powers should be the benchmark for the way the powers of search, entry, seizure or questioning are exercised.

If any agency, if I can use that term to cover everyone that has these powers, is given power, the starting point is it must be no greater than the powers contained in the statutory charter. If Parliament wishes to confer on an agency powers greater than those in the statutory charter, there should be a clear statement of the need to do so, the reasoning behind it to justify the conferring of a greater power and a conscious act of Parliament agreeing to confer those powers greater then the charter on that agency for those circumstances and the reasons for so doing. That is insurance that agencies are not bidding unnecessarily for greater powers; that parliamentarians are aware of the benchmarks; and that votes on these powers when they are sought to be greater are done consciously so parliamentarians and the public know they are conferring greater powers than the statutory power. That seems to me to provide an appropriate balance between the need to give greater powers than the standard in particular

circumstances, while not allowing the sort of incremental slip-back of increasing powers without proper scrutiny or questioning.

For that reason also, it is our position that the powers of search et cetera should always be contained in an act of Parliament rather than conferred by delegated powers through regulation. Again, it is not to hamper the investigatory agencies, but to ensure the power is conferred publicly by Parliament and that any increase beyond that standard is done by conscious choice with proper parliamentary debate and argument and the capacity for public knowledge and awareness of it. The reality is that regulatory decision making does not get the same public awareness as parliamentary decision making. Because it is, although a necessary power, an invasive power, it is one that should be done openly and publicly with the capacity for input.

The next point I wanted to make in relation to that was the fact that at the state level, as at the commonwealth level, there is an enormous disparity in the powers that currently exist. I adhere to what I said on behalf of Liberty Victoria to the Senate committee about that, that it is more a matter of historical accident than a conscious conferring of different powers on different agencies for particular reasons. Although politically or in public terms it is harder to undo a greater power already confirmed than it is to limit powers conferred in the future, the principal starting point should be that the powers are no greater than the statutory code, if I can call it that. While it may be unrealistic to consider that all previous powers greater than that should be repealed and brought back into line, there should be some process, if a statutory code is introduced, of measuring existing powers against that and evaluating whether there is a need for the existing powers to continue or whether on a case-by-case basis they be brought into line or consciously kept within the existing power for good reason. It seems to be a way of balancing the cultures that already exist, but with a statement of principle that we should be starting from now and should not be afraid of escaping from because these things have grown up in a piecemeal way.

Again, when I was speaking to the Senate committee we discussed at some length about the tax act and the extraordinarily broad powers existing under that act compared with other acts conferred on other agencies. Some of those powers were conferred as early as 1910 and it is clear that the consciousness about people's rights and liberties was very different from the awareness now. So part of the historical accident is a different awareness of people's rights at a time when earlier acts were passed rather than the conscious acceptance of the need to give a greater power then or now. That at least would bring the past into line with a line in the sand now so that any future act conformed with the standard or was a conscious deviation after parliamentary debate and measured against the standard. I have tried to come up with a way that helps deal with that past as well as the future.

We agree that the benchmark should be the benchmark applicable to the police. The Senate committee recommended the powers conferred on the Australian Federal Police under the commonwealth Crimes Act, which in many ways follows the Victorian Crimes Act. It does not seem to be inappropriate to have a benchmark being the powers of the Victoria Police under the Crimes Act rather than the powers conferred on the Australian Federal Police. There is merit in that as there is already operational knowledge and procedure about the Victoria Police powers of entry and search. There is an enormous amount of learning and expertise and the greatest amount of judicial scrutiny of the exercise of those powers that is formed, not just the statutes, but judicial interpretation. By and large there has been an appropriate balancing of the police powers to investigate with the citizens right of freedom of operation. That seems to be a sensible starting point. The police have been sensible in working out protocols in matters such as obtaining warrants out of hours. So what may have been acceptable 20 years ago in terms of using emergency powers to enter without a warrant out of hours have been brought into line with modern technology so that there is always a duty magistrate who is supposed to be and is in fact available 24 hours a day. There is a protocol for faxing through or giving evidence by telephone so that urgency and out-of-hours concerns can be dealt with. The Victorian procedure, commended by the Senate, in relation to the return of an executive warrant to the magistrate for identifying what had been done, who had been the warrant holder, the exercising of the powers under the warrant and what had been seized under the warrant was something we consider was rightly commended by the Senate committee. It is a good benchmark for the powers to be conferred upon other agencies.

Given the responsibilities the Victoria Police has for dealing with crime in the state, it is hard to argue that other regulatory authorities should have greater powers and less accountable exercise of those powers than the Victoria Police. We see the judicial control over the granting of a warrant and the return of the warrant as being essential. Having an independent third party scrutinising the granting of the exercising of the warrant rather than allowing someone within the organisation to authorise it is as an important balancing point because it is such an intrusive means.

The protocol that the Victoria Police has worked out in relation to dealing with challenged documents, particularly challenge in relation to legal professional privilege, by sealing documents, delivering them to the court and then

having the challenge sorted out at a later date, is again a process that we believe other agencies can and should learn from and that should be part of the standard. The fact that it has worked, that the police are comfortable with it and that it has become something parties can respect and accept gives heart that it is something other agencies can learn to work with. There are not complaints to the police that evidence is lost.

The CHAIRMAN — Would you give the background of that process and procedure?

Ms HAMPEL — In the 1970s and early 1980s when police seized documents and there were claims of legal professional privilege, after some ugly cases involving almost physical fights over documents, a protocol was worked out. It was done initially between the bar council, the law institute and the Victoria Police; and the Law Council of Australia, following the same process, did one with the Australian Federal Police. Once police have a warrant and are searching and a claim for privilege is made in respect of documents the police then do not look at the documents. They do not get the knowledge of what is contained in them. The documents are placed in a sealed envelope or box, depending on the number of them, and delivered to the court with the privileged endorsement on them, and the privilege claim is then litigated. The lawyer has to make the claim for privilege and there has to be a determination by the court of the process.

As a matter of procedure, what has happened is an informal arbitration so that police and the parties may agree to appoint an independent third party — traditionally a silk — to inspect each document and to decide whether the claim of privilege is properly made or not. Depending on the urgency that can be done in a faster or slower time frame. The documents that are properly the subject to the claim of privilege are returned. The documents that are not properly subject to the claim of privilege are provided under warrant to the police. What is important is that from the moment there is a contest about the documents they are preserved, but the information within them does not improperly get into the hands of the investigators. There may be some delay until the privilege claim is sorted out, but the documents are not lost and there is no suspicion that the solicitors will hand them on to someone else in a different place or something like that.

That is important because the privilege is that of the client and not of the solicitor, so the solicitor's obligation has to be to take the claim unless and until it is waived by the client or a court says it is not subject to privilege. That protocol is something that can as easily be adopted by other agencies seizing documents. If there are complaints about documents being seized that are outside the scope of the warrant, that can be covered in exactly the same way — that is, put in a sealed document, delivered to the custody of the court and sorted out when the dust settles.

It is a simple procedure and has withstood the test of the last 20 years and is one that should not cause any greater problems for agencies then it causes for police, ASIC and the like, which all work under those guidelines. That is why we say to look at what powers the police have, the control over the police, the powers for dealing with contested issues and to use them as the benchmark and enshrine them into the code and deviate from it only if good cause is shown and if Parliament think so too, and not just the agencies.

That is a much better way of dealing with it than starting from the other end and saying everyone knows that tax avoidance is a bad thing and we have to get tax avoiders. Although that is clearly the result being worked towards, the principle has to be no greater intrusions than necessary. They are the general principles that I had to speak about and say that, by and large, we are generally in support of the principles contained in the Senate committee that the committee has picked up in its report.

Mr KATSAMBANIS — Thank you for outlining the principles Liberty Victoria thinks should guide the legislative framework in this area. The committee has heard submissions today and has received written submissions that suggest that because there is some executive oversight of the actions of departmental officers and executive responsibility for their actions somehow the higher standards that apply to the police are not necessary because the executive oversight provides a protection for the public that is not provided for in police matters. Would you comment on that?

Ms HAMPEL — The problem with executive oversight is that it is often exercised by the very agency exercising the power. Therefore, what the agency considers may be justifiable may not be considered justifiable by an independent third party which looks at it and which can apply the principles generally. To me it is too close and not sufficient independence, and the significance of the judicial oversight in the granting of a warrant, except in emergency circumstances, is one of the features that provides a confidence that there is not an abuse of power and a sanctioning of the abuse of power by somebody who is directly connected with the one exercising it. It is to do with accountability, and executive oversight does not provide that accountability.

Essentially what the police are investigating are more serious matters. If there is a standard for more serious

matters that have a judicial overview, in Liberty Victoria's view that same standard should be applied to those exercising even greater powers but arguing for lesser scrutiny.

Mr KATSAMBANIS — The committee heard submissions today that suggest that because police investigate more serious criminal matters the standard for the police should be higher and although some other agencies may have more draconian powers, using a pejorative term, that is justified because the seriousness of the offences is not so great and the sanction for those offences is not so great. I believe you were present when similar comments were made by one agency. Would you comment on that?

Ms HAMPEL — With respect to those agencies, they have got it by the wrong end of the stick. The less serious the matters being investigated the less justification there is for the exercise of coercive powers of search, entry, seizure and questioning, and the more important it is there is independent scrutiny of the exercise of those powers to ensure they are not exercised beyond the lawful purpose or in a way that is capricious or otherwise improper. The fact that the agencies acknowledge that the matters they investigate are less serious to me supports, firstly, that their coercive powers should be less intrusive than those investigating more serious matters and should be subject to as much scrutiny, if not more, than those investigating more serious matters.

Mr KATSAMBANIS — On a different tack, does Liberty Victoria have any evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, to indicate that the powers contained in Victorian legislation have led to serious miscarriage of justice or serious concerns for the ongoing administration of justice in Victoria?

Ms HAMPEL — To take it at the basic level, we get a regular log of complaints about the exercise of powers by transport officers — people who exercise powers under the Transport Act. They may not be entry into someone's home and search, but they are entry into a carriageway or bus, the demanding of a name and address which often results in an exchange that leads to a trifecta on charges of abusive behaviour, offensive language and drinking on the train, or something like that.

It is usually relatively minor harm, something like putting feet on a seat, not paying a fare or drinking on a train. It is not armed robbery. It may be unpleasant and difficult and people do have an obligation to pay fares on public transport, but they do not necessarily justify arbitrary powers of arrest, or of demanding the name and address, when someone is not doing anything wrong but is simply minding their own business but may be a bit different, perhaps a bit smelly because they are homeless and are more likely to be a target than somebody who looks like you or me. We get regular complaints about transport.

We also get a series of complaints relating to people on either public or private land, where there is an environmental issue, for example, a campaign about logging or a national parks issue.

Some of the parks or wildlife powers can be exercised in ways that again do not necessarily conform to the way one would expect police to exercise powers. We tend to get those sorts of complaints, rather than complaints by people saying the state revenue officers have stormed in without a warrant and taken all other documents, because that is the nature of the organisation that we are.

What I say can only be anecdotal. It is not any proper representation of wholesale abuses of power. Having said that, I do not think there are wholesale abuses of power. However, the problem is that if somebody has the capacity to exercise greater power than they need for the purpose, and if there is no independent scrutiny either by reviewing or somebody else having the chance to say whether a warrant should be issued or somebody else having the chance to criticise behaviour by, for example, excluding evidence improperly obtained under a warrant, if there is not any power to have a proper investigation for a complaint about an improper search or seizure then they are not really going to come to light.

We are talking often about difficult power, or imbalances, so that those who are affected by it may not know that they have rights, because they may not be told what the powers of search and entry are. They may not be told that they have a right to complain and there may not be complaint mechanisms. If they are in circumstances where they are dependant on somebody for a licence or for their continued existence to do something there may be other considerations leading to a lack of making a complaint or countenancing of inappropriate conduct or abuse of power. So I am afraid that we can get some snapshot of some areas but not a complete answer to your question from that.

Mr STENSHOLT — I must admit there is a bewildering array of different provisions in the many acts, from acts providing the need for a search warrant or the ability to do things without a search warrant — the ability to search on a peremptory basis — to others which require a written notice in order to get documents. Sometimes

you have to provide identification, at other times you do not have to, and the list goes on. A comparative analysis would take about several thousand pages before we even started. You are suggesting that there be a benchmark. One of the things which comes up again and again is that acts provide for entry and search with a warrant or without a warrant, and you get these parallel paragraphs. Do you have any further comment on that? Interestingly enough sometimes they are not even used, but it seems to provide a certain amount of comfort for the agencies to have these powers.

Ms HAMPEL — Again I come back to the Victorian police powers as a good starting point. Generally we would say that a search should not occur without a warrant and that the warrant should be granted not by a superior officer in the agency or organisation signing off but by a judicial officer — an independent person — scrutinising it.

The power to enter without a warrant should be restricted to emergencies — and they have to be real emergencies where there is no capacity because of the urgency to obtain a warrant — but given the facilities that the Magistrates Court has made available for out-of-hours grants of warrants they should be very restricted indeed. That is the general tenor: warrant unless there is an emergency, and an emergency has to be defined in a way that does not mean that somebody can simply say, 'It is out of hours', or 'The thought just occurred to me'. There has to be a conscious consideration of why the out-of-hours service provided by the Magistrates Court cannot be accessed.

Again, in those circumstances a fail safe should be built in of a sanction by a senior officer and not as part of the actual investigation before the non-warrant power is used. There is no point in somebody who is doing the investigation saying to their boss, 'I want to do this with without a warrant'. It has to be somebody removed from it. If because of such urgency and emergency there is no capacity to go to the Magistrates Court then it should at least be a superior officer in the organisation not involved in the operation. The only rider I put on that is the regulatory matter — that is, the monitoring issues of whether the health inspectors can walk in and see if the fridge is clean.

Mr STENSHOLT — That is right.

Ms HAMPEL — And again there was considerable discussion before the Senate committee about this. If it is in a monitoring category rather than that of suspicion of commission of an offence there are circumstances where it is appropriate that an officer or investigator of an agency should be able to enter without a warrant. But we would say these conditions should then apply: it has to be in normal business hours — they cannot come early in the morning or late at night and demand access to the books; and it has to be in circumstances where the person who has the identification that is part of the code advises the person of their rights.

I would say that this should be considered as the benchmark, although you might think it is perhaps bearing a bit too far on the libertarian side, that if an occupier does not consent to a non-warrant monitoring entry or withdraws consent to a non-warrant monitoring entry the search should cease at that time, but that the withdrawal of consent would provide a basis for the application for a warrant. The withdrawal of consent may well be something that would be significant to the decision-maker and whether the circumstances justify the grant of a warrant.

Mr STENSHOLT — Then you have the issue of how you determine an emergency.

Ms HAMPEL — Yes, and again given the facilities that the Magistrates Court has made available, which is not what I would say is going over and above the call of duty. It is actually a proper recognition by the Magistrates Court that if they were to be the people responsible for the granting of warrants they would have to recognise there would be many circumstances where these would occur out of hours. But if we are talking about searches essentially in business hours and consent is withdrawn or not given, then rather than continuous search without a warrant or without a consent — because there may well be issues about whether the searcher is acting in or outside power, looking beyond what they can do — then immediately a halt is called, a warrant is sought and obtained and it is only if one can establish there were reasonable grounds for believing an offence was there and then being committed or evidence was there and would then be destroyed that that the use of the emergency power would be justified.

Mr STENSHOLT — Yes, walk outside, get an SMS and be back inside within a minute.

Ms HAMPEL — Exactly, but it is not as if someone these days has to go out and queue or drive away or anything like that.

Mr STENSHOLT — Following on from the diversity that we have discovered, there are obviously under some acts special situations. You may or may not agree that there are such things as that, but we have just dealt

with the taxation ones where a number of provisions relate to electronic equipment, which are certainly not in the Fisheries Act, although arguably they could be because of the records that would be held in that way. But then the people are compelled under these provisions to operate the electronic equipment to provide the records for the investigating officers. While you will not try to benchmark it, do you see that such specialised aspects of entry, search, questioning and seizure would be reasonably widespread or would be so narrow as to be very rare?

Ms HAMPEL — We were talking about locked safes or locked filing cabinets or information that is stored electronically that can only, in the short-term at least, be accessed by the occupier. We are really talking about the means rather than something that new technology has brought to us. A warrant normally has as a condition that the occupier has to provide access and allow — —

Mr STENSHOLT — Cooperate.

Ms HAMPEL — Cooperate, that is right. That general power to cooperate may need to be spelt out in terms of — if the information is stored electronically — accessing it or permitting the officer to access it, download it, copy it or whatever. The police have for years been seizing whole computers where people have declined to cooperate or where they fear that by asking somebody to copy it they will in fact wipe it.

Mr STENSHOLT — Seizing a computer may often not help because the data may be stored off site.

Ms HAMPEL — Yes, but the general power to cooperate may have to be interpreted differently, depending on whether something is in a locked safe or stored electronically somewhere. But it is all part of the same condition, so I think the argument about special measures does not hold up in those circumstances. Again we are talking about historical accidents that have led to different powers, and I think it is from people starting by arguing about the evils they are trying to overcome rather than looking at the principle as to how you can search, what you can take and how to go about it. So I think if we start from the principle end it is easy enough to deal with the electronically stored information where you need assistance.

Mr KATSAMBANIS — The definition of documents and the power in Victoria for search warrants for individuals to cooperate covers almost every considerable possibility?

Ms HAMPEL — Exactly. Again, Victoria Police has been smart in picking up from the language contained in subpoenas and using the language of search warrants, and Victoria Police is well resourced. They have access to very good legal advice and they sensibly use it. It is not beyond the bounds of our legal drafting skills to either have the parliamentary drafters do it in terms of warrants or getting that information or assistance.

The CHAIRMAN — Today we have heard from a range of agencies that have all had their different needs and requirements, including the Environment Protection Authority which saw a possible need for an increase in its powers to pull over vehicles suspected of carrying hazardous waste or anything pertaining to hazardous waste and the opportunities for it to also look at cases where there might be an appropriate power to enter ships in certain circumstances. We have heard the State Revenue Office request that it have the power to place an injunction over assets so that they were not dissipated, and we have heard of concerns regarding the transport inspectors' powers to question people who are travelling without tickets or who might be breaching some other regulation. I want you to comment on one other issue, which is the range of questions that may be appropriate to a transport officer to pose to someone travelling on public transport who does not have a ticket. What right should an inspector have?

Ms HAMPEL — To ask the person whether they have a ticket or to ask them to produce the ticket, so I would say to ask them what attempts they have made to buy or pay for a ticket, although I know that is a difficult area because under our current law even if the ticket machine is not working or the station is not staffed that does not absolve one from the responsibility for having a ticket. But if a person does not have or does not produce a ticket then I think there should be the power to ask a name and address but no more — certainly not to ask the name and address at the start. To me it has to be a triggering cause for demanding the name and address. If somebody is sitting there apparently minding their own business and not obviously without a ticket or not obviously committing another offence, to me there is not even that justification for asking their name and address.

Mr KATSAMBANIS — Do you think the ability to at least offer to sell the person a ticket could be a good thing?

Ms HAMPEL — Yes indeed. That will certainly weed out those who are genuine from those who are just saying, 'I tried to and I could not'. If the idea is essentially to make people pay for their travel on the train rather

than to create a class of criminal offence, then giving the person the means to pay the ticket is obviously right.

Mr KATSAMBANIS — It seems axiomatic to me.

Ms HAMPEL — Yes, I am not sure it is in the terms of the inquiry, but if it is I am very pleased, and I hope they find a way to solve it.

To come back to a more serious part of your question, look at what has been looked at; the severity of the matter being investigated should have a direct relationship to the extent of the power of intrusion required. So to come back to the point that I think Peter was making about some of the agencies that said earlier that looking at minor matters justified having great powers and no accountability seems to me to be upside down. The more serious the matter the greater the need for an intrusive power, and once there is an intrusive power the greater the need for scrutiny and accountability. The less serious the matter the less intrusive the power should be.

The CHAIRMAN — If in response to the question a young person said their name was George Bush, would that be the end of the matter from Liberty's perspective?

Ms HAMPEL — We do not require people to carry identity cards or proof of identity in this country. It is one of the great freedoms that we enjoy here.

The CHAIRMAN — Still.

Ms HAMPEL — Still, that is right. There is a trade-off for freedom like that, and that is that somebody may give a false name, and because we are not required to carry identification that means that people may not have identification on them and should not be subject to questioning or arrest because they do not carry identification. As a matter of principle it should stop at name and address, even if it is a name like George Bush. It is not such an unusual name. When you get to Donald Duck you might have a little more concern. But again, unless the act contained an obligation not only to provide a name and address but to provide a correct name and address then that would not justify any further inquiry into the truthfulness of the answer of the George Bush name. At the moment the act requires you to give a name and address but not to give your correct name and address — and I would have thought properly, because it was acknowledged in that right not to have to say anything more than what was required in response to requests by authorities.

The CHAIRMAN — My final question would be if you were a director of one of the transport companies in Melbourne brought on board because of your legal expertise, would you have a different perspective on that question?

Ms HAMPEL — I would be a difficult director I think, because I would be arguing for the least intrusive measures to achieve the end, and if the end is ultimately to have people pay their fares on the buses and trains rather than build up the number of people who are charged or the number of people who are fined and who therefore pay an added penalty, then you may not in many cases get to the need to ask the name because you will get your money from your fare by giving the opportunity to pay on the spot. Where a person does not have the money or the means to pay and therefore you want their name in order to charge them, that may justify a form of inquiry for that purpose, but again it always has to relate to the purpose rather than start from the other end, if that is of any assistance.

The CHAIRMAN — On behalf of the committee, thank you very much for the giving of your time and your eloquence to the committee.

Ms HAMPEL — I thank you for inviting me and giving me the opportunity.

Committee adjourned.